I SAW HER ONCE/ HOP FORTY PACES THROUGH A PUBLIC STREET/ AND HAVING LOST HER BREATH, SHE SPOKE, AND PANTED/ THAT SHE DID MAKE DEFECT PERFECTION/ AND, BREATHLESS, POWER BREATHE FORTH -- Anthony and Cleopatra, Act II Scene 2

Frank Sargeson's "More Than Enough": A Review

Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Frank Sargeson’s prose style is efficient, direct and self-effacing, and it is well-suited to the man. I have gleaned this from the second book in his autobiographical writings, which is called “More Then Enough”, was written between 1971 and 1973, and chronicles his life and work from the early 30s to the 1970s (or thereabouts), during which time he worked and lived primarily at his borrowed bach on the Auckland’s North Shore. Having approached this book after a sustained bout of Dickens reading, I was particularly struck by the plainness of Sargeson’s style. He tends to avoid punctuation, sometimes in a manner that would invite disapproval from English teachers, and as well as being long his sentences are swift and unmannered, like this one:

It is perhaps remarkable that despite the stream of rejection slips I became accustomed to, and despite my applying a rigorous self-scrutiny to every page of the stories I wrote and finding all of them without any exception falling short of the standards I had set for myself, I never over at least four years doubted that if I would if I persisted at last succeed in writing something which would be clearly marked by a quality special to myself.

If Dickens were to express the same information in a single sentence, it would probably run something more like this:

It is perhaps remarkable, that despite the stream of rejection slips I had become accustomed to; and despite my applying a rigorous self-scrutiny to every page of the stories I wrote; and despite finding that all of those pages, without any exception, fell short of the standards I set myself: I never at once doubted, over at least four years, that if I persisted I would at last succeed in writing something, which would be clearly marked by a quality that was special to myself.

To say that Sargeson’s writing is swift and unmannered is not to say, of course, that it is careless and crude. I imagine that it is pretty hard to find a writing style that allows one to write a hundred and fifty pages of narrative prose without boring or irritating the reader: it would need, for a start, to be even without being monotonous, and varied without being erratic. And to my admittedly untrained ear, it looks as if Sargeson’s style achieves both of those goals while at the same time causing the reader to concentrate rather on the things that he writes than the way in which he writes them. His rhythm, like other distinctive rhythms, is such that after spending a reasonable amount of time in its company the reader starts to discover that rhythm in other writing she reads, whether it be in letters to the editor or other novels: it is as if the reading faculty has been so clearly impressed by this particular mood and pace and style that the imprint has struck down into a deeper tissue than usual, and so that mood and pace and style is still present and active when one goes and reads something else, in a kind of literary after-image. And so in that sense it is a striking style of writing; but for some reason this does not make it an intrusive style. Rather the reverse is true: something in the swiftness of Sargeson’s prose means that he is able to convey a lot of matter clearly and directly and without any interference from the manner of its presentation. At one point Sargeson hints that this directness was an ideal to which he consciously aimed. He writes about one particular afternoon that is very heavily impressed on his memory, for the reason that it brought him a kind of epiphany of style, a discovery that one particular style, which appeared seemingly by accident in a prose piece he was writing that afternoon, was the one for him:

For the time being I was done with elaboration and complexity, with involved and decorated prose which I had hoped would express what I had to say, and by its very complication prove to the reader that what I had to say was valuable. What especially delighted me was that despite the simplicity of my sentences, they could in a page-long sketch achieve an unexpected totality not to be compared with the meagre sum of parts. I remember exactly my day of discovery, a Saturday afternoon when, with speed and sureness never before known to me I wrote the five hundred or so words required for ‘Conversation with my Uncle.’ (51)
Of course it was not quite as easy and immediate as all that. It looks as if Sargeson continued to ask and answer questions about the proper style to adopt well into his writing career, as I suppose most writers do, and it seems like it was a long time before this perfectionist settled upon a style that he could comfortably regard, if not as perfect, at least as satisfactory.

Was language merely the tool the novelist worked with, or was it part of the raw material of life he worked upon? Or was it a complex and difficult combination of both? If language was only a tool then the less attention it attracted to itself the better, and all fine writing and delight in words for their own sake had better be done without. But things of that kind might very well be permitted if language was part of the raw material…And there was no end to the number of questions, all so difficult and complicated I felt I must collapse under their burden. (94)

And other, more specific questions were also in need of answers, one related to the questions about place and identity that Sargeson (as anyone, I am sure) was interested in, and which I want to write about later on: “It made me uncomfortable to remember that I had myself aimed at a kind of Galsworthian prose style. [Does anyone know Galsworth?] So the question became inevitable: whether their might not be an appropriate language to deal with the material of New Zealand life?” (93)

The style that Sargeson finally settled upon (at least as it appears in this book) is distinctive not only for the structure of his sentences; and perhaps his unerring directness might be more easily traced to his language rather than his syntax. Sargeson repeatedly mentions his great admiration for poets, and his even greater admiration for Poets, and considers that, in light of the relative lack of renown enjoyed by this fine species, it might be a good idea if prose writers put more poetry into their writing, so that society in general was properly imbued with their subtle and fragrant art. If he takes up is own advice, however, he does so with enough subtlety that it is hard to find passages that are poetic in any obvious way. His diction is spare, as his use of the more recognisable poetic devices. As far as I can tell this is not, however, a fault, and the absence of any “delight in words for the sake of it”, or metaphor for the sake of it, means both that the “raw material” of his writing comes more directly to the reader, and that the poetic passages are more striking and effective when they do arrive. On the seventeenth page of the book he writes about his response to the news that he most probably should leave his uncle’s farm, saying that he “experienced a kind of shattering.” The figure would be innocuous and uninteresting if it were not that the previous seventeen pages had been written without aid from such devices: his discipline generates a poetry of its own.

The discipline of the prose has its counterpart in the discipline of the man, who had not only to bear the trials that face anyone who wishes to write fiction books prolifically and well, but also the various extra hardships that face an ill person who wished to pursue that vocation in New Zealand in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Only a person who has made a sustained attempt to write good novels will know what are the difficulties involved in such a task, but Sargeson does well to convey them to the normal reader.

This is the true core and essence of the matter: nothing on the paper to begin with, and within a couple of hours, or three or four…there must be words made into sentences, everything scrawled, corrected, deleted, interlined, word kites flying in the margins; yet all with life breathed in, with the heat of energy manifest as wit and humour, pain and tragedy, comedy and laughter, maybe just plain narrative line – all hanging together, fitted to the pattern of what has already appeared upon a hundred pages of two hundred yesterdays, and will appear upon another hundred of many more tomorrows. (77)

…but I knew well that the sort of writing I was attempting could be achieved only by the exercise of a rigorous discipline; that there must be the daily facing up to a blank sheet of paper, on which after so many hours there would be words and sentences – which any intelligent person of good-will might find interesting to read. (31)

Writing too was a mighty consumer of energy, besides a task one often went to with reluctance-not solely on account of its difficulty, but because every problem had to be wrestled with in solitude. (22)

To keep all of this up day after day required not only a great love for literature and a strong hope of eventually succeeding artistically and perhaps also critically, but also a great resolve. Even Sargeson, successful though he eventually became, had times when his interest in writing and his self-belief became frayed, and needed either outside help or mulish resolve to stop them from falling apart altogether. He was told at one point by Denis Glover (New Zealand poet, printer and soldier) that he and his writing were “pre-war”, and that accordingly he should forget about ever getting anything decent published (113); he was, as any writer must be, dismayed and overawed by the genius of past artists (95), and despaired of ever achieving what they had; his work was frequently rejected by his London publishers. And Sargeson’s need to work hard was heightened, at least in his own eyes, by his perceived lack of any great natural talent. He affirms quite blandly and openly that he really was not overly gifted at all, and hence that “everything over many years had to be learned.” And learning meant forcing oneself to learn, especially when disillusion or hardship made learning an unnatural process: at such times “there could be no room for excuses, for any elasticity of discipline, and even a touch of brutality might well be an advantage.” (131) Success requires hard work: somehow I think that has been said before, but it is worth repeating, and Sargesons’ case is interesting not only for the resistance he received from his human limitations (however large they really were), but from the environment in which he lived.

Sargeson’s environment was New Zealand in the middle years of the twentieth century. His relationship with this environment is complex and interesting, and the various shades and changes of that relationship may be regarded as one of the main themes of the book, as I expect they are a theme of Sargeson’s fiction. At its best, Sargeson’s connection with the New Zealand of his time is deep and innate, an aspect of the relationship that is clearest in his devotion to his uncle and his work on a farm somewhere in New Zealand (I don’t think a place-name is given). He writes feelingly about life on the land:

…it was a profound satisfaction to be exhausted at the end of a long day: the work had been its own sufficient reward, and I am sure it was the same with my uncle quite regardless of repetition year after year. Nothing, I told myself, could be more attractive than full stretch of wits and body followed by rest renewal repetition – in other words the prolongation of human life from day to day at a level which kept one right in touch with the commonest elements of human history and experiences. (14)

He writes just as feelingly of his uncle, who like Sargeson lives a life devoted to doing the kind of work in which “every problem encountered had to be wrestled with in solitude” (22), and who was to Sargeson a man of such fine quality that he (Sargeson) hesitated to represent him in fiction, afraid that his art could not do justice to the original.

Unfortunately, and despite this love for the land and for some of the people on it, Sargeson discovered many fellow citizens who were much more likely to fail in doing justice to Sargeson’s art, rather than the other way around. This is not to say that the locals were hostile or indifferent to Sargeson’s particular kind of literature, and that Sargeson resented their criticism; rather, that they were either hostile or indifferent to any kind of literature at all. He is not infrequently nagged by his parents to go and do something useful (law, for example, in which Sargeosn had a qualification and professional experience), instead of “wasting his time” with his literary work. He fields many suggestions, sometimes explicit and sometimes not, sometimes amiable and sometimes not, that his literary work is not really work at all, but a rather frivolous kind of holiday. He is very grateful for the company of Rex Fairburn, partly because the poet and lobbyist was a genuinely witty and learned person, and he gave “conversation which could be as fruitful as it was various as it was always possible”; but also because this intellectual vitality was, in Sargeson’s experience, “a rare kind of thing to encounter in my own country.” (49) When the German poet and scholar Karl Wolfskehl (I do not know this person) arrived in New Zealand, venerable in body and mind, and apparently named by Thomas Mann as “the last European man” (105), Sargeson often found cause to feel pained and embarrassed by how the Auckland response to his presence compared so unflatteringly to the response, say, of Venice; and at such times he “blushed for my country and its inhabitants.” (107) Even Rex Fairburn sometimes dismays Sargeson by setting his clumsy antipodean boot among the subtleties of European cultural life. And, overcome by his “momentous literary discovery” on that unforgettable Saturday afternoon, Sargeson did not expect that the significance of the event would be appreciated by his living companion, a “moderately literate” former sailor who responds to Sargesons’ excitement (“I had just discovered a new way of writing”) by clearing his throat and rustling his paper and doing not much else: and Sargeson writes resignedly that this man was “as good an index as any to the public reception I must expect from the environment I inhabited.” (51) Sargeson’s position is mirrored in that of another of his literary companions, Walter D’Arcy Cresswell; who, despite giving radio talks and readings that Sargeson describes as unsurpassed in New Zealand broadcasting, is deeply in debt with the green-grocer and is frequently in a state of uncertainty (more so than Sargeson) as to the source of his next meal. Meanwhile, Sargeson relies for the material for his weekly radio commentaries on snatches of broadcasts that he overhears while standing in shops or loitering in the evenings outside other people’s homes. (83)

So Sargeson found his own country a source of difficulty and doubt, especially when he compared its cultural achievements with those of England and Europe. But he also doubted his own capacities for the same reason. In the presence of Wolfskehl he is sometimes “weighed down by all that civilisation,” as he was when he walked the streets of England and the continent. For Sargeson, however, this awkwardness is as much an affirmation of his identity as it is a criticism, a reminder that he had in Europe “discovered myself to be truly a New Zealander, with my most truly spiritual place my uncle’s farm.” (111) It is worth looking at two more instances in the book in which Sargeson shows himself to be “truly a New Zealander,” before this essay comes to its belated conclusion: firstly, his garden; next, a man called Harry. These are interesting for their New-Zealandness, but also for other reasons.

For a long time Sargeson’s garden is for him not only a healthy-minded pastime but also one of his primary sources of physical nourishment. Wolfskehl regards this as a mark of his nationality: not only is this fellow able to write books, but he can also “grow his cabbage with his own hand.” (109) Sargeson’s garden is one of the more reticent characters in the book, but it is also one of the most important. As mentioned, it is a continuation of the earthy labour that he carried out at his uncle’s farm. And, as a very time-consuming task that is necessitated partly by his lack of money, it is a symbol of the lowly status in their own society of literary people, and the extra discipline that was required to sustain a writer’s life. But it is representative of the writing process itself, and although Sargeson does not make explicit the resemblance between his writing and his gardening (his style is too spare), the two activities make good companions. They both require some sort of raw matter before their important products can spring into growth. One of the things that I find astounding about anyone who writes fiction prolifically, is where they get their ideas from. To be sure, their material is the thoughts and doings of human beings, and those thoughts and doings are all around us; but one needs so many thoughts and doings to fill up a novel, and many more to fill up a life of novels, and surely such an abundance of output makes the amount of readily available input seem small and inadequate to the task. By way of comparison, arguments are all around us in the same way that thoughts and doings are: but how much more argumentation one must need, how much raw material one must have to collect, before one can write a book on philosophy, and how much more to fill up a lifetime of philosophising. Sargeson’s case is especially interesting, because he seems to have lived in such an isolated manner, detached from the thoughts and doings that he would seem to need in order to form a good base for literature. At times he had qualms about this sort of thing: he reports at one point becoming distressed by the “monstrous” need to question himself about “what exactly was this material of life.” (94)

Most of the time, however, Sargeson seems to have been quite well equipped with this raw stuff, the compost of literature, and perhaps he gained possession of it in much the same way he gained possession of the dead leaves, vegetable waste and manure (left by the horses and carts on his street) that he used as a base for his garden, a necessary grounding and a useful stimulant for the rich and varied produce that, like writing, comes forth in its best and fullest form only after years and years of “arduous and exacting compost-making.” (70) And, as with his compost, so with his writing: the trick, if you want to get enough raw stuff to spawn a novel or a garden, is to pick up the stuff that other people ignore or dislike or miss through the lack of effort. Sargeson loitered out on the road in the hope of some passing horse-shit much as he loitered outside other people’s houses so that (as well as getting his weekly radio broadcasts) he could gather up the manners and habits and phrases and symbols which those people let drop without knowing, and which they would not want to know about even if they could. A collector of other people’s waste does not look like a very salubrious individual: there is something eccentric and anti-social about collecting other people’s horse-shit, and there is the same unhealthy look about someone who makes living out of collecting other people’s habits and vices. But the other trick, to writing as to gardening, is to discover what is rich and healthy and pungent in the dropped waste of others, and to let those virtues feed a growth that will in the end be more palatable and enriching to the people who would not have the mind or the time to discover the same qualities in the original matter: and so Sargeson takes a conversation with an uncle and turns it into a symbol or a lesson, a parable of some kind; and so also writes about the “conforming people” who were “more or less the rule in my environment,” but does so in such a way as to bring forth what is healthy about their way of life, to “show them in their common humanity despite their occupational and household trappings.” (132)

One who benefits from Sargeson’s diligent collection and application of manure, is a man called Harry. Harry has a great fondness for horses, but he has through an underhand manoeuvre from the authorities been banned from the racecourse, and is left to find other work for himself where he can. He lives at Sargeson’s bach for a good thirty years, impressing the writer with a devotion to reading the racing pages that is as steady and unflinching as Sargeson’s devotion to writing his pages of fiction. Sargeson admires Harry for a number of reasons, but most relevant here is his affinity with horses, an affinity that recalls the close link between Sargeson’s uncle and his farm. He writes:

When however I for the first time saw him on the horse, my revision of all previous notions about possible relationships between human beings and horseflesh was instant. I think I reacted much as the American Indians are said to have when they first saw a mounted Spaniard, and supposed that man and beast were blended into a non-divisible entity never before known to him. (66)

Harry’s horse dies, unfortunately, and because of the horseman’s reticence Sargeson is left to imagine how things transpired, an activity that of course was, along with his discipline and his constant collecting of local detail, a vital part of his novel-writing process: a writer, like a gardener, has not only to collect more raw matter than the normal person, but also to work on that matter with a special skill and intensity, so that as much as possible of its natural richness is used to the advantage of its products, and Sargeson’s evocative gifts ensured that he drew as much life as he could out of the seeds he was given: “Great areas of his life and character remained inscrutable to me, but for that very reason he was constantly stimulating my imagination. (71)” And of course there was also his profound interest in the lives of human beings, his “insatiable curiosity about every manifestation of natural life which has never in a life-time deserted me.” (57)

Harry was not a deeply learned German poet, but Sargeson found him both personally attractive and imaginatively fertile; and perhaps this is a sign of his fondness for his own country, and his willingness to call it his own. Of his relationship with Harry Sargeson writes:

Never when I had found myself moved by sympathy and compassion for the universal individual universally caught in the universal fate had I become involved to the point of saturation: that is to say some part of myself remained detached, resting in a state of reticence and reserve. Now I was to know what it was to be totally committed to another person.

Perhaps More Than Enough can be regarded as the story of Sargeson developing a broader commitment of a similar kind, a commitment to his own country. If not, it may without injustice be regarded as the story of his growing commitment to writing; and in that story one can find an account of the universal writer universally caught in the universal fate. One can find his struggles with his work, not only in his search for the right style and the right material, but also in his occasional questioning of his very desire to spend his life writing a page of creative literature a day, and of his ability to succeed at such an undertaking. And in the hostility and indifference of many of the people around him one can find the struggles that occurred between his chosen work and his environment, an environment which he did not choose but which he came to an intimate relation with, in fiction and in life.


Michael Bycroft

Ada Wells Essay: The Moral of the Story

Monday, November 20, 2006

“If art does not extend the sympathies, it does nothing morally.” In saying this, the nineteenth century writer George Eliot made two assumptions: that morality is essential to art, and that sympathy is the key to morality. How valid are these assumptions when applied to the work of modern writers?


The key to moral life is that nobody is quite sure what it is, but art profits from morality’s breadth as much as it adds to its depth. It is generally agreed that a “moral” act is roughly equivalent to an act that a person “should” perform, and that a moral person acts in the interests of other people, but beyond that there is very little fixity, and the morality of George Eliot’s time was quite different from that of our own. Art has also changed, in its form and its content, and the writing of modern authors is noticeably different from George Eliot’s efforts. If she says different things from modern authors, however, and if she says them in different ways, she still speaks our language, and her time is not so distant that we cannot understand what she means when she writes about art, sympathy and morality.

“Sympathy” can refer to a number of different human qualities. It can denote intellectual understanding, as well as a considered awareness of other people’s social, cultural or personal condition. It can also mean something more emotional: an intense and unexamined sensitivity to other people’s suffering, and an attended desire to ease or comfort them. Thirdly, it can refer to an imaginative faculty, a talent for recalling, picturing and re-enacting the experiences of real or fictional people involved in real or fictional events, and this capacity for vicarious experience, a mental figuring-forth, is the kind of sympathy most relevant to art. Artists are measured largely by their skill in deploying it, and the experience of art relies for its success on the readers’ ability to reproduce the imaginative act. Art, Plato argued, is a kind of drug: “even the best of us enjoy it and get carried away with our feelings” [1]; and if we cannot quite agree with his tone then we can all agree with his observation. Art conditions feeling, but it also conditions thought, both by giving readers matter upon which to exercise their intellect and by setting pictures in their minds. “Through images”, wrote Salman Rushdie, “we seek to comprehend the world.”[2] Ludwig Wittgenstein, had a similar idea: “What I invent”, he wrote, “are new similes,” [3] and if pictures can shape the minds of logicians then their tools are all the more effective on the softer tissues of ordinary thinkers. It is clear from these observations how art might have moral force: for, if correct thought promotes correct action, then art can promote good acts, and if people can feel the vicissitudes of other people through art as keenly as they feel their own, then they are more likely to act in each other’s interests. Further, when art and sympathy do not serve these ends we are less likely to call them “art” and “sympathy.” A sympathiser who expresses tender regard for the sufferings of others, but does nothing to ease them, is looked upon with a little distaste, and their sympathy seen as affected or self-serving; and a novel that seeks purely to entertain is unlikely to be called “art.” “Bad literature of the sort called amusement”, wrote Eliot, “is spiritual gin”[4], and although we might express the idea differently, we can still recognise its truth. In Philip Sydney’s undying phrase, the purpose of art is “to teach and to delight”, and there is as much reason to demand the former as there is to desire the latter.

All of this is commonplace, but it also has complications, complications that Eliot may not have foreseen, that modern writers have spent a number of decades trying to describe and understand, and that have their origins in more general developments in political, cultural and social life in the decades since Eliot’s career. For one thing, we are less inclined than Eliot to express unbounded confidence in the decrees of Duty, or in the existence of an inviolable moral order. In 1882, two years after Eliot’s demise, God was pronounced dead. Eliot, who had more sympathy for people than deities[5], might have agreed quite happily with Nietzsche’s aphorism; but the elimination of God, for Nietzsche, was not the point. The possibilities that this opened up, the thrills and dangers of a Godless world, were the more interesting things, and they were enough to send lunatics running screaming through the market place. They were enough, a century later, to produce the dark and vivid world of Anthony Burgess’s Clockwork Orange, and in this world Eliot’s nineteenth century mores are opened up by a very keen and thorough knife.

A second book, a second set of concerns, and a second kind of question, directed at both Eliot and the modern world, are furnished by a second modern author, Yann Martel. Martel is a traveller of the body is much as of the mind, and his diversity of interest, manifested in the award-winning Life of Pi, is representative of one of the more conspicuous and interesting trends in modern writing. As Eliot saw, sympathy is useless unless it means a transcending of difference, a connection between us and those people who “differ from [ourselves] in everything but the broad fact of being struggling, erring human creatures.”[6] Today, however, “difference” means a little more, and ranges a little wider, than it did in Eliot’s time, and the broader terrain of modern-day writing has its own heights and pitfalls, some of which Martel navigates successfully and some of which he does not. Like A Clockwork Orange, Life of Pi shows that modern writers, despite new interests and new complications, are still preoccupied with morality, with how people should think and live, and that art’s capacity to “extend the sympathies” is still the key to its moral force.

Alex, the eloquent and blasphemous hero of Anthony Burgess’ novel, would not have pleased George Eliot. “It is for art to present images of a lovelier order than the actual”, she writes, “gently winning the affections, and so determining the taste.”[7] The dystopia of A Clockwork Orange does the opposite: Duty is as absent as God, and the vacuum they leave behind sucks in all kinds of depravity, from petty theft to murder, from pornography to rape, and the book seems as morally indifferent as Alex himself. Nevertheless, it is a moral book, and it is precisely its lack of clear moralising that gives it it’s moral impact. Its force is in its scepticism: it goes to the extremes of amorality in order to strengthen and clarify the morality that its narrator shuns, and it does this in two ways: firstly, by showing readers a world without sympathy; secondly, by showing how sympathy can force such a world into a less monstrous shape.

Alex is a criminal because he enjoys it. Violence keeps him tense and active, sex is a splendid release, and sex and violence together are “gorgeousness and gorgeosity made flesh.”[8] He is free to enjoy these things because there is nothing to stop him, no divine, social or parental buffers to soften his coarser and more antisocial instincts. He has no deep feelings for his “droogs”; he is unaffected by his counsellor because he is indifferent to the older man’s opinion; his family fails to restrain him because his “P & M” earn only his contempt; and he can assault a wife in front of her husband because he is unaffected by the suffering of either. He injures others because he is unmoved by their injuries: he is amoral because he has no sympathy.

Eventually Alex’s luck runs out, of course, and he is subjected to the Ludovice treatment. The Ludovico treatment works because it manufactures sympathy, and here, Eliot’s disapproval would have been most fierce: she would protest, along with the prison Chaplain, that Alex’s “sympathy” is insincere, lacking true benevolence, the “forgetfulness of self in recognition of our common humanity,”[9] upon which Eliot’s conception of morality was based. It is easy to agree with Eliot, and Alex’s treatment seems little more humane than the violence it is designed to suppress. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to disagree either, and one can respond to Eliot’s criticism in two ways. The first is blunt: if “sympathy” means feeling terrible when others suffer, and feeling relief and joy at charity self-denial, then “sympathy” is precisely what Docter Brodsky manufactures, and the only objection to his technique is that it succeeds at the expense of Beethoven. This is reasonable, but there are more palatable and useful responses, that is to recognise the second of the three Ludovico processes that operate in the novel: the gradual and more subtle Ludovico treatment of life. In the book (unlike the film) Alex develops a normal moral life, and it his sympathy (for his imagined child and for his imagined wife) that causes him to evolve from a barbarous delinquent into an approximation of a decent citizen. His sympathy may or may not be self interested, but that is beside the point; the point is that A Clockwork Orange shows how Nietzsche’s brand of demonic atheism can be overcome by simple human exigencies: Alex’s moral status improves when he responds to the pains of loneliness, meaninglessness, and age. Because of these normal persuasions, he needs neither God nor Duty to urge him towards morality. For Alex in his dark and disorganised world, the process is slow, and Alex does a lot of damage before he settles into his adult calm. Ludovico’s chemicals speed the process up, but in doing so they make it abrupt and artificial and inhumane, and in the end Ludovico’s scientific approach is ineffective. These are the two extremes, as Anthony Burgess presents them. By pointing out the repellent extremes he attracts us towards the pleasanter space in between them: the space where a society performs its version of the Ludovico treatment both reliably and humanely, developing the sympathies of its members as best it can, so that each member has persuasive reasons to act as the others wish them to act.

This process of cultivating moral sensitivities is not a task for art alone, and A Clockwork Orange does not suggest that it is. Nevertheless, the novel shows the effectiveness of art in manipulating people’s conception of right and wrong, and of guiding their sympathies in particular directions. Brodsky’s Ludovico treatment is the most obvious example. Here, as in Plato’s cave, a shackled victim is forced to watch images of people projected onto a wall by a higher authority, but in Alex’s case the “higher authority” is Dr. Brodsky, and the shadows that he projects on to the screen have nothing fixed or immutable behind them, and nothing particularly Good; there is just art, a shifting, arbitrary and manipulative medium that has all the persuasive power of reason and less fixity. Language, the medium of both art and reason, is as deceitful as any other art form, and throughout the text, Burgess makes the most of its wiles. Language, for example, makes Alex likeable. “The meaning of language”, wrote Wittgenstein, “is in its use”[10], and Alex, whose “Nadsat” words have not been used before, provides a running demonstration of this principle: his words acquire meaning as he uses them, and the people and events that surround their use ensure that their moral import is weaker than that of the equivalent English words. The people Alex meets are, for the most part, dull and uncultured. His parents spend their days in a factory and their nights watching “gloopy world-casts” on television, and his “droogs” are oafs and sycophants. Alex’s fellow prisoners are brutes, the Minister for the Interior is an oily-tongued opportunist, and even Alex’s victims (a sordid drunk, for example, and two girls who share “the same ideas, or lack of”[11]) are hard to like. It is a charmless world; Alex, with his wit, creativity and Beethoven, is charming by comparison, and because his words have no clear, pre-determined meaning they are susceptible to change, susceptible to the favourable connotations that their user, attractive as he is, gives to them. Alex’s language helps to “muffle”, as Burgess puts it, “the raw response we expect from pornography.”[12] It is a well- made artifice, and a superb piece of art. It does not show that a person’s sympathies will always be extended in a moral direction (quite the opposite), but it does show how far sympathies can be stretched under the pressure of language.

But it is not entirely an artifice. Alex is not just attractive in spite of his crimes, but because of them, and Anthony Burgess is quite clear on this point: “my intention in writing the work”, he wrote, “is to titillate the nastier propensities of my readers,”[13] and when Alex places himself on the same level of the reader (“O my brothers” is his standard address) it is as much a warning as it is a plea. Anthony Burgess is not alone in appealing to the baser instincts to thrill his audience, and many works of fiction thrive on their capacity to arouse the reader’s “nastier propensities” without seeming too nasty. The difference between A Clockwork Orange and pornographic art, however, is that Anthony Burgess is artful and original enough to cause readers to reflect upon their nastiness, to indulge, recognise, and consider its place in an ordinary moral life. It is this reflection that makes A Clockwork Orange a moral piece of art.

Yann Martel also has moral interests: like A Clockwork Orange, Life of Pi is concerned with the ability of art to encourage the kind of thoughts and actions that the author considers right. On the whole, Martel’s artifice is less successful that Burgess’s, but this should not conceal the fact Life of Pi, the winner of the 2002 Booker Prize, is a very deserving piece of art. It is varied, thoughtful and entertaining, and one of its main themes is the value of sympathy. Pi, the internal narrator and the main character in the book, is a model of sympathetic virtue. He is comfortable at any point between fact and faith, and his two best friends, Mr. and Mr. Kumar, are at either end of the spectrum. He has all the sympathies one would expect from a zoo-keeper’s son, and his environmental concerns may be traced back through George Eliot to one of the novelist’s favourite[14] authors: “as they [animals] share something of our nature through the sensitivity with which they are endowed”, wrote Rousseau, “man is subject to some sort of duties towards him.”[15] Pi might have disagreed with Rousseau on the sort of duties demanded, but he shares the conviction that those duties exist. He is as sensitive to religion as he is to animals: his earliest love is Hinduism, but his zeal for Jesus, Bibles, Arabic, the Prophet and prayer mats is just as intense and just as important, and he seems to understand and appreciate the faith of every believer he finds. Other people cannot, and it is implied (most strongly in the fractious meeting between a priest, pandit and imam) that the world would be a much nicer place if everyone could share Pi’s sympathetic verve.

Martel also wishes to show that art is one of the most forceful ways of propelling the sympathetic impulse. In the “Author’s Note” (written by the fictional journalist who writes down Pi’s story), the narrator addresses the reader: “If we, citizens, do not support our artists, then we sacrifice our imagination on the altar of crude reality, and we end up believing nothing and having worthless dreams.”[16] There is as much crude realism in Life of Pi as there is in Silas Marner, but Martel uses it for a slightly different end; namely, to make readers believe what they would usually read with disbelief, to extend the reader’s sympathies by extending their imagination. Pi’s adventures are fantastic, but what makes them believable is the narrator’s obedience to “crude reality”, the unadorned details of material existence, and Martel’s narration is as systematic, as composed, and as conscientious in recording crude fact, as his literary forbear, Robinson Crusoe. Where Burgess uses new words to describe recognisable (if obscene) acts, Martel uses recognisable detail to create a bizarre and challenging seascape. Both force the reader to think in unfamiliar ways, to “extend the sympathies.”

As with A Clockwork Orange, however, so with Life of Pi: there are complications, and the complications point towards a feature of modern experience that was less pronounced in George Eliot’s time; namely, the problems associated with diversity and difference. There is the obvious practical problem of existing peacefully among different people, but there is also the artistic problem of representing unfamiliar people and cultures without either exaggerating their difference for dramatic effect, or insulting their difference by ignoring those elements of their culture (history and politics, for example) that make it different. The first error has been called “exoticism” and the second might be called “decontextualisation”, and Martel’s novel suffers from both.

For all his scientific, religious and environmental sympathies, Pi is rarely required to make any major moral judgements. George Eliot, writing about one of her contemporaries puts the matter rather well: “he is fond of what we may call disembodied opinions, that float in vapoury phrases above all systems of thought or action; he likes an undefined Christianity which opposes itself to nothing in particular…an undefined amelioration of all things.”[17] Pi has more substance than the unfortunate targets of Eliot’s wit, but he does share some of their foibles. He is rarely forced to judge people, or to interact with them in any morally significant way. It is true that he spends over eight months in a lifeboat with a large and savage animal, but this situation is too bizarre and too obviously abstracted from the processes of real life, in India or anywhere else, to produce any real moral insights. Further, Pi’s love of God is too broad to have any real depth, and by concentrating in the most “vapoury” and metaphysical elements of religion he ignores the more real and challenging parts. He ignores, for example, the history of conflict that exists between the three religions that he follows. In a discussion between representatives of his three favourite religions, he cannot understand why anyone could be divided over cultural or nationalistic matters, and is innocently alarmed when the three men nearly “come to blows.” He is thoughtful, but he is also a little childish, and for Pi (a youth at the time) this is excusable. For Yann Martel it is not, and his attitude to reason, conveyed through Pi, is also a little naive. “Reason”, he says, is a “fools gold for the bright”, an ability to “shine at practicalities – the getting of food, water and shelter.”[18] Beyond that, says Pi, reason is dispensable: “If you stumble at mere believability, what are you living for?”[19]. In many ways this is a commendable attitude, and world would be a pleasanter place if more people held it. Nevertheless, Pi misses something out: although people may believe anything they wish to believe, it is generally agreed that people cannot do whatever they wish to do, and a certain amount of reason is required to determine which is the most moral (as well as most practical) way to act. “It is one thing to feel keenly for one’s fellow-creatures,” wrote Eliot, “another to say, ‘This step, and this alone, will be the best to take for the removal of particular calamities.’” In particular, reason can help to solve the calamities of difference. Metaphysics alone does not reconcile religions, in fiction or in real life, and by denying the moral utility of reason Martel ignores one of the tools that might help to ease some of the problems that difference can cause.

Martel’s account of Indian life not only ignores the more difficult and unattractive elements of the sub-continent, but concentrates on those aspects of India that are most likely to appeal to a tourist’s conception of the country. India, according to Life of Pi, is profuse, strange and irresistible. The zoo is filled with vipers, zebras, pacas and golden agoutis, the Hindu temple is described in wonderfully sensuous terms, the Arabic tongue is made up of “guttural eruptions and long flowing vowels”, and the house of the elderly Pi is a mysterious and charming place filled with books, shrines, icons and strange spices.[20] The story is fantastic, but it is also determinedly jolly, and the author begins his account with a good-humoured candour from which he rarely departs. Jesus’ grazed knees are “fire-engine red”, the sinking ship gives out a “metallic burp”, Richard Parker (a man-eating tiger) is a “life-boat with teeth”. Even in his most hopeless moments Pi is inexplicably sunny: when his ship sinks, he enters into conversation with an adult Bengal tiger; when he finds himself in a lifeboat with a group of life-threatening zoo animals, he gives a cheerful account of the hyena’s cosmetic deficiencies; and, when his hunger, weakness and delirium are at their peak, he conducts a witty dialogue touching on various subtle points of lifeboat cuisine. For a story about suffering, despair and starvation, it is all a little too much fun, and the infallibility of Pi adds to the disjunction between the art of Life of Pi and the reality of normal living: the lead character has a knack for insouciant heroism, is brilliant, or at least highly competent, at almost anything to which he applies himself, and there is reason to doubt that Eliot had this kind of person in mind when she wrote about the importance of sympathy. “I wish to stir your sympathies with common-place troubles”, one of her characters promised, “to win your tears for real sorrow, sorrow such as may live next door to you - such as walks neither in rages nor in velvet, but in ordinary decent apparel.”[21] Pi’s troubles are not common-place, his adventures are not decked out in “ordinary decent apparel”, and the sympathy that he stirs up is diluted by an equal mix of enjoyment and fascination. This is not to say that books should not be enjoyable and fascinating, nor that foreign countries are never genuinely exotic; it does show, however, how difficult it is to produce art that is both interesting and edifying, and that is as sensitive to a nation’s real difficulties as it is to its exotic charms. Fiction, Martel suggests, is a process of “selectively transforming reality”, a matter of choosing “the better story.” This is no doubt a true and valuable point, but if the “better story” is the story with the most extraordinary plot and most charismatic hero, and if reality is transformed only to make gravity seem lighter than it is, then the lesson loses much of its value.

Eliot has less of Martel’s naiveté, but Martel had a more diverse set of problems. Anthony Burgess had less of her moral optimism, but enough art and honesty to make morality work in an amoral world. All three writers treat art, morality and sympathy in different ways, but all three try to do more than merely sermonise or entertain, and even if they have faults there is as much to gain in their errors as there is to praise in their successes. The world has changed since George Eliot. It will certainly keep changing, and art and morality will change with it, but if it did not change there would be nothing new to write about, and even if it changes more dramatically in the future than it has done in the past, it is unlikely to change so much that writers will no longer be interested in how people think, how people act, and how art can change both for the better.

Michael Bycroft

[1] Plato, “Republic”, 605 d)
[2] Rushdie, Salman, Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991, London: Granta, 1991, p.
146
[3] Monk, Ray, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, New York: Free Press, 1990, p. 357
[4] Eliot, 1884, p.358.
[5] Noble, p.72-8
[6] From Letters, vol. III, no.3, 1859, reproduced in Noble, 61.
[7] Eliot, George, Essays and Leaves from Notebook, 2nd ed., London: Blackwood and Sons, 1884, p.327
[8] Burgess, Anthony, A Clockwork Orange, New York: Norton, 1988, p.32
[9] Noble, 64, extracted from Walter Edwards, The Victorian Frame of Mind, Yale: New Haven, 1957, p.278.
[10] Monk, 340
[11] Burgess, 44
[12] Burgess, 1988, from “Introduction: A Clockwork Orange Resucked”, x.
[13] Ibid., ix.
[14] Reading Rousseau for the first time, Eliot was struck by “the rushing mighty wind of his inspiration”, and her moral thought was similar to that of the mud-wrestling Romantic. (Quote extracted from an 1849 letter, and reproduced in Dodd, p.306.)
[15] Rousseau, J.J., “Discourse on Inequality”, First and Second Discourses ed. Roger D. Masters, 1964, St. Martins: New York, p.97
[16]Martel, Yann, Life of Pi, New York: Harcourt, 2001, p.xii
[17] Eliot, 1884, p. 201.
[18] Martel, p.98.
[19] Ibid., p.297
[20] Martel, p.45-6
[21] Noble, p.70, extracted from “Amos Barton”, in Scenes of Clerical Life, chap.7

New Zealand’s Indigeneity Problem

Wednesday, November 15, 2006

I write a lot of the time for The Package which is a weekly gig guide has leaning pretensions as a pulse and market place of youth culture. Which is telling enough in numerous ways, but the biggest problem I’ve ever really encountered is their tendency to swap the word New Zealand for Aotearoa. The surprising thing here though is that this tendency comes from a different source than the biculturally earnest hangover of the eighties that most people in academic circles would so inevitably reach for. The Package’s preference for Aoetaroa is much the same as another eighties fad in which a kiwi and triangle tired to make us “buy New Zealand made”. For inside its cache, the appellation Aotearoa is working to set about a pride bearing commodity within the youth market place. A prime example is the clothing label Huffer, who in their upsurge, as relative unknowns in 1997 to sheer ubiquity come the turn of the millennium, are leading runners in the ground swell precociousnes of this Aotearoan pride. Effectively nothing more than Anglo-American leisure wear with NZ-Aotearoa icons plied on top, Huffer went big with their “I love NZ” iconography, which was accompanied by an effective marketing drive which endorsed wife beater tees, crate bottles and the borrowed Maori pride of their skateboarders ex high schools such Takapuna and Tokoroa, two polarities in the socio-economic streams of New Zealand. Such strategies effectively flattened such diversity into the one feel good millennial moment of the youth cultures: Aotearoan pride as a self supporting consensual “massive”.
But if Huffer have the clothing range stitched up, then one little record label in Wellington has cornered that other precious marker of the youth; music. Loop recordings is an outfit that has been happy enough to use the Aotearoa label as a load bearing structure in a marketing campaign that has sold product through that consensual inducing lore of a localised ‘pride’. Like most things youth this has always been carried along by the social problematics of coolness and stigmatised lameness. Albums like their “Wai Wahine” are such commodities, never so much selling the music, as they are the idea of the producer as a localised, feminine entity we should all be proud of. At its time of release, the company, in a synergistic marketing one-on-one moment teamed up with Staple to run a cover story on this ‘young, able, and willing’ bounty. Which in its come-hither appeal begins to seem really similar to the unproblematic days of Maoriland and those Hinemoa pin-ups which beckoned in New Zealand as a localised happy-go-lucky land of pleasure. But anyway back to The Package.
On the whole there’s never been that much of a problem in The Package’s editorial right to change New Zealand into Aotearoa. But when they did it to my Tony De Lautour article what emerged was a whole different set of priorities that really do shed light on that unstable ground of production that is New Zealand. For when De Lautour’s work is so preoccupied by New Zealand as a sort of primal myth which is constantly shifting about upon its own myopic platform of subterfuge and conceit, then changing the terms of approach, by simply swapping Aotearoa into New Zealand starts to look like New Zealand’s programmable revenge. Which is frustratingly problematic, for the very thing you are trying to uncover in writing about De Lautour’s work is this consumable frenzy. So when editorial impacts, for the sake of consensual market place politics start swapping words around on you, you do almost realise that you’re starting to get somewhere. For whilst New Zealand, on a pure marketing level, has never been hipper, its sublimation and requisition of Aotearoa needs to be read inside its own consortment with that happy ‘cool’ homogeneity of New Zealand’s surface. Because it is this very homogeneity which is so appealing to a consumer-able market, this Aotearoa boosterism needs to be read as the latest in a long running continuum of load bearing structures. For in its feel good indigeneity we fail to realise that just when New Zealand might tell us something, we have simply requisitioned another sycophantic mirror which does nothing more than continue to reinforce the pastoral propriety New Zealand has always been so predicated upon.

Hamish Win.